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Fitting Your Theory to the Facts: 
Probably Not Such a Bad Thing After All 
1. Introduction 
In the following pages I shall try to show that the variety of Bayesian confirma-
tion theory based on so-called personal probabilities provides an intuitively cor-
rect solution to an outstanding problem in a controversial area of methodology, 
and that it does so in an entirely natural and unforced way. In the course of the 
discussion it will, I hope, become apparent that the objections usually thought to 
be decisive against Bayesian theories in general, and especially against this one, 
are in reality nowhere near as damaging as they seem; and I shall end by making 
the possibly surprising claim that Personalist Bayesianism offers just the sort of 
theory of confirmation, fallibilistic in temper, founded on deductive principles 
only, yet fruitful in methodological information, with which even Popper himself 
should not be able to find fault (though he would, and does, of course, because 
it is 'subjective'; but more on that later). 
2. The Null-Support Thesis 
The outstanding problem is the ancient one of what epistemological distinction 
if any we are entitled to draw between a theory that has independently predicted 
an observed effect and one that has been deliberately constructed to yield the 
effect as a consequence. One answer to that question, and an extremely popular 
one, is to deny that the second theory derives any support at all from its 'predic-
tion' of the effect in question. An apparently powerful argument in support of this 
position is the following. If we were to concede that the second theory is sup-
ported by the known effect, we should, or so it appears, be faced with the awk-
ward, if not intolerable, consequence that it becomes a simple matter to generate 
arbitrarily many theories that are supported by any given piece of data, but that 
are, intuitively speaking, not really supported at all. For example, suppose that 
A's heuristic deliberations result in a hypothesis, call it H, that x and y stand in 
a specific functional relation y = f(x), and that A then tests H with a large number 
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n of joint observations (x1,Y1), ... ,(Xn,Yn) of x and y. Suppose also that, 
within the given error bounds, the observations all lie on that curve. While we 
will probably agree that the observations confirm H, we should equally probably 
be reluctant to concede that they also support each of the infinitely many hypothe-
ses determined by a particular choice of g: 
y = f(x) + (x-x1)(x-x2) ... (x-Xn)g(x) (1) 
(These ad hoc variants, essentially precursors of Goodman's 'grue' hypothesis, 
were introduced into the literature by Jeffreys [1948] 3). 
Non-Bayesian theories have difficulty with hypotheses like (1); that the obser-
vations do not by themselves appear to discriminate between them and His after 
all precisely the rub of Goodman's paradox. Bayesian theories at least have the 
formal capacity to discriminate by means of an appropriate distribution of prior 
probabilities: to what extent this is successful is a question I shall answer later. 
Without leave to appeal to considerations of plausibility prior to the data (possi-
bly, as in Jeffreys's Bayesian theory, which I shall discuss briefly later, based on 
considerations of simplicity, in some one of the numerous explicata of that trou-
blesome notion), there seems to be no intrinsic difference between Hand its vari-
ants (1) that justifies denying them all equal status in explaining and being sup-
ported by the observations. But there is an extrinsic, but apparently quite 
objective, difference: the hypotheses (1) are constructed specifically to fit the 
data, while H was not. According to what I shall henceforward call the null-
support thesis, the variants (1) are not supported by then observations, precisely 
because they were deliberately contrived to explain those observations. 
The null-support thesis has a long and respectable pedigree: it is to be found 
in Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz; it is a principle incorporated into Popper's the-
ory of corroboration, and we find it recently endorsed by Zahar (1989, 16), Red-
head (1986), Giere (1984, 159-61), and Worrall (1978, 48). In what follows I 
hope to show that, despite this powerful advocacy, the null-support thesis is false. 
Indeed, I shall produce some hypotheses that well-established canons of scientific 
procedure pronounce very strongly supported by the data they were constructed 
to explain. It follows that the reason we tend to depreciate the ad hoc alternatives 
(1) cannot be that they are constructed from the data. What is it then? It is, I shall 
argue, just because they are irremediably ad hoc; because, in other words, the 
structural model implicit in the parametric hypothesis: there are ai, ... ,a,, 
such that for all x, 
y = f(x) + (x-a1) ... (x-a,,)g(x), 
where g is not identically zero, is thought not to correspond to the actual state 
of affairs; we just don't think it true. And in general, hypotheses simply contrived 
to fit the data will be looked askance at, not because they have been made to fit 
the data, but because they have been contrived simply to fit the data; which is just 
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another way of saying that we have, as far as we can tell, no independent reason 
to believe them true. 
These remarks are not as empty of explanatory value as they might appear. 
The falsity of the null-support thesis means that a more flexible account of support 
is required, which, in the course of explaining when and for what reasons we as-
cribe support to hypotheses generally, explains also why we discriminate within 
the class of hypotheses constrained to fit specific pieces of data, as to which merit 
support therefrom and which do not. I shall provide such an account. It is, I shall 
argue, implicit in the Personalist Bayesian theory, which does indeed say that the 
variants (1) will be assigned vanishingly low support ifthe structural models im-
plicit in them are sufficiently strongly disbelieved-as indeed, by assumption, 
they are. But the most important consequence of the Bayesian theory is the fun-
damental principle of all inductive inference: evidence supports a hypothesis h 
the more, the less it is explicable by any plausible alternative compared with its 
explicability by h. This is the criterion by which in practice we decide which data 
support a hypothesis and which do not, and it is a criterion that can just as easily 
be satisfied by a hypothesis constructed from that evidence as by one that was not. 
Much of the motivation for the null-support thesis comes, I think, from a de-
sire to legitimate a preference, which it is alleged that a study of the history of 
science reveals, for hypotheses that independently predict facts over those that 
merely accommodate them. Whatever else this preference reflects, however, it 
is not that the former are always better supported by those facts than the latter. 
For there are convincing counterexamples to that doctrine too. Lest it should be 
thought that things are now going too far in a direction away from the null-support 
thesis, I shall show that the Bayesian account explains why, of two rival theories, 
initially equally well supported, but differing in that one independently predicts 
data that the other merely absorbs into the evaluation of a free parameter, the 
former receives the greater support from those data. This result is, I think, the 
germ of truth in the generally false thesis that the independent prediction of facts 
invariably merits greater rewards of support than their post hoc explanation. 
These conclusions will be shown to follow straightforwardly. No arbitrary as-
signments of prior probabilities, no fiddling or gerrymandering the formulas are 
necessary; what will emerge from the discussion is just how essentially Bayesian 
our informal reasoning is. I recognize that any such conclusion is bound to be 
greeted with strong reservations in many quarters, and I shall conclude this paper 
by trying to show that the usual objections advanced against allowing the Bayes-
ian theory a role in 'objective' methodology are unsound. 
Some preliminary words are in order about the Bayesian theory that is being 
credited with these virtues. That theory is, as I have already said, the one that, 
following L. J. Savage, has come to be called Personalist Bayesianism. It exploits 
the fact, explicitly stated and proved only in this century, but taken for granted 
from the outset, that the probability calculus furnishes the fundamental laws of 
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fair odds, or to be more precise, fair betting quotients (betting quotients p are 
related to odds x by the equation p = x/(1 +x), with inverse x = p/(1-p)). Fair 
odds are odds that would give no advantage to either side of a bet were one to 
be called; whether any such odds exist, however, or what they are if they do, is, 
except in a very restricted class of cases, a matter on which the theory eschews 
an opinion. 
The significance of setting out the general laws that any system of fair odds 
must obey is that from the very first, when people started talking about the proba-
bilities of hypotheses, they habitually glossed those probabilities as what would 
be, relative to the contemporary state of knowledge, the fair betting quotients in 
the ideal situation that the bets could be unambiguously settled. Now a famous 
result, proved in this century independently by Frank Ramsey and Bruno de 
Finetti, implies that if any set of betting quotients fails to satisfy the calculus of 
probabilities, then those betting quotients cannot all be fair. What Ramsey and 
de Finetti in fact showed was that if an opponent is free to dictate which side of 
a bet you will take, and the stakes on each, then were you to engage in simultane-
ous bets with betting quotients that do not satisfy the probability calculus, you 
could be forced to make a loss (or gain) come what may. But if a betting quotient 
is fair, the advantage to taking a given side of a bet should be zero; and the net 
advantage relative to a system of bets at fair betting quotients should also be zero, 
since it is a sum of zeros. So if someone could tell in advance that a particular 
betting strategy would entail a positive loss or gain, and hence presumably that 
the net advantage at those odds cannot be zero, then it follows that the odds are 
not all fair. Ramsey's and de Finetti's theorem tells us, therefore, that the rules 
of the probability calculus are nothing more than consistency constraints on the 
construction of a set of subjectively fair betting quotients, i.e., betting quotients 
that you believe, in the light of your available information, determine fair odds. 
The fundamental notion in the application of this theory to the problem of in-
ductive inference is that of the conditional probability, P(h/e), of h relative toe. 
Your conditional probability of h on e is what you would assess the probability 
of has, were you to come to know e (but nothing more). P(h/e) is, by Bayes's 
theorem, equal to P(e/h)P(h)(P(e))- 1• P(e/h) is called the likelihood of h on e, 
and is equal to one if h entails e (modulo initial conditions and the more or less 
extensive quantity of other background information you are equipped with). 
Where h describes a hypothetical physical probability distribution over a set of 
data points, some measurable subset of which is defined bye, then P(e/h) is set 
equal to the probability h ascribes toe. P(h) and P(e) are the so-called prior proba-
bilities ofh and e respectively. e is reckoned to support h if P(h/e) > P(h), and 
the difference between the two is a useful measure of the extent of this support, 
which clearly can be negative. The fact that support is defined in terms only of 
the relation between the conditional probability P(h/e) and the prior P(h) implies 
that the so-called 'dynamic assumption', that after receipt of e (and no stronger 
228 Colin Howson 
information), your degree of belief in h should be P(h/e), is unnecessary, at any 
rate from the point of view of the Bayesian account of inductive inference. 
The only endogenously determined quantities in the Personalistic Bayesian 
theory are the likelihood terms P( e/h) in the conditions stated above, and the prob-
abilities of necessary truths and falsehoods relative to the individual's background 
information. The prior probabilities in Bayes's theorem are not usually of this 
type and are, therefore, parameters undetermined within the theory. This fact of-
ten leads people to believe that the account Personalist Bayesians give of inductive 
inference is subject to no significant constraints at all, and is consequently ir-
remediably 'subjective', a mere branch of psychology, and not very good psychol-
ogy at that. I shall simply ask the reader to wait until the final section for the 
discussion - and rebuttal- of this well-worn accusation. 
3. The Falsity of the Null-Support Thesis 
Since arguments have been put forward for the null-support thesis based on 
what appear to be unobjectionable methodological precepts, we perhaps ought 
first to see where these break down. There seem to be two such arguments: 
(i), advanced by Giere and Zahar, is that ifh was designed to explain, and at the 
very least to be consistent withe, then h stood no chance of being refuted by those 
facts described by e. Hence, it is concluded, h cannot be supported by e, since 
support bye allegedly implies the possibility of refutation bye. The second argu-
ment, (ii), is due to Giere and Redhead, who assert that when the data are used 
as an explicit constraint in the process of constructing a hypothesis, then the prob-
ability of the data given the falsity of the hypothesis cannot be small, but on the 
contrary must be unity. But evidence, they contend, supports a hypothesis that 
predicts it when and only when it would be improbable if the hypothesis were 
false. 
This criterion embodies a quite fundamental intuition. It is the intuition behind 
significance testing, for example: the null hypothesis (i.e., the negation of the 
proposed causal hypothesis, usually identified merely with the hypothesis that the 
observed data are due 'to chance') is rejected, and the causal hypothesis cor-
respondingly confirmed, if those data are very improbable on the assumption that 
the null hypothesis is true; and-for future reference-it follows immediately 
from Bayes's theorem, in the form 
P(h/e) = ___ P_(h_) __ _ 
P(h) + P(e/-h)P(-h) 
P(e/h) 
as entailing a high posterior probability of h when, as is assumed in Giere's and 
Redhead's discussion, e is probable given h. In general, though, as the expression 
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above makes clear, it is merely the likelihood ratio P(e/-h):P(e/h) that has to 
be small to confer a high posterior probability on h. 
I shall not quarrel with either the improbability criterion, or the principle 
enounced in (i), that support for a hypothesis h from an experiment (a term I shall 
use to describe any data source) requires the possibility that the experiment is 
capable in principle of generating also refuting outcomes. Indeed, I shall be 
claiming that both these are naturally explained by the Bayesian theory. What I 
quarrel with is the claim that from either or both follows the null-support thesis, 
and I shall show that that claim is false. 
Let us start with (i). Giere states that 
if the known facts were used in constructing the model and were thus built into 
the resulting hypothesis . . . then the fit between these facts and the hypothe-
sis provides no evidence that the hypothesis is true [since] these facts had no 
chance of refuting the hypothesis. (1984, 161) 
Glymour (1980, 114) voices a substantially identical opinion, and much the same 
occurs, in a slightly more elaborate way, in Zahar (1983, 245) (incidentally, ig-
nore the fact that statistical theories are not strictly refutable; we can take these 
authors to be using the word 'refute' in a sense that accommodates weaker criteria 
than the purely deductive). Plausible though it may sound, the argument is quite 
specious. How canfacts ever have a chance of refuting anything? If e is a factual 
statement and h a hypothesis, then it is simply false to say that e has a chance of 
refuting h; it either refutes h or it doesn't, and it does so or doesn't whether h was 
designed to explain e or not. Giere has confused what is in effect a random vari-
able (the experimental setup or data source E together with its set of distinct pos-
sible outcomes) with one of its values (the outcome e). It is only E, note, that 
has the chance of refuting any particular hypothesis. Moreover, it makes per-
fectly good sense to say that E might well have produced an outcome other than 
the one, e, it did as a matter of fact produce. It follows that whether or not h was 
deliberately designed to explain e but nevertheless does so, E (in general) could, 
on the occasion on which it produced e, have generated another outcome inconsis-
tent with h. Obviously, once E is performed and e results, there is no chance of 
that performance ofE refuting h; but, as we have seen, this would be true whether 
h was designed to explain e or not. Either way, (i) collapses. 
(ii) fares no better. Apropos Mendel's use of the observed ratio of tall to dwarf 
pea plants in the second filial generation of his famous experiment, Giere remarks 
that "fitting this case was ... a necessary requirement for any model to be seri-
ously entertained. So there seems no way [in which the data could be improbable 
given the negation of Mendel's factorial hypothesis]" (1984, 118). Let us not dis-
pute Giere's rather doubtful assumption that Mendel invented his theory to ac-
count for the data (though too exact agreement with those data caused Fisher 
(1936), in a famous paper, to conclude that the theory was in fact constructed 
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first). But we should certainly dispute the validity of his argument, for the conclu-
sion is a non sequitur. I at any rate can see no reason, and Giere provides none, 
why the data should not have been regarded as improbable on the supposition that 
Mendel's hypothesis was false. It might of course be argued that as the data are 
by assumption already known to have occurred, their probability must of neces-
sity be equal to one, and hence equal to one conditional on the negation of Men-
del's hypothesis. Glymour (1980), in a well-known argument, does indeed charge 
the Bayesian with having to accept just this conclusion. 
I shall discuss Glymour's claim later, and argue that it is false. However, even 
were it true, it would not be a good strategy for supporters of the null-support 
thesis to adopt, since it would mean that there could be no way of distinguishing 
the support of hypotheses by data already known at the time both hypotheses were 
proposed, and that one hypothesis was designed to explain and the other explains 
independently. In either case, the probability of the data relative to the negation 
of both the hypotheses would be one, and neither would be supported according 
to the criterion-contrary to the declared opinion of virtually all the advocates of 
the thesis. 
Writing, however, from an allegedly Bayesian position, Redhead (1986) 
seems to provide the linking argument Giere needs, but does so only by trans-
forming Giere's premise, that constructing a hypothesis to explain e is tantamount 
to making the explanation of ea necessary condition for any hypothesis to be seri-
ously entertained, into the explicitly Bayesian, and very strong, condition that in 
such cases e acts as a 'filter' allowing only those hypotheses nonzero prior proba-
bility which, modulo a set a of auxiliary hypotheses and other statements asserting 
that suitable initial conditions have been satisfied, entail e. From this considerably 
strengthened form of Giere's premise we do indeed infer that 
P(e/ - h&a) = 1. 
(I have followed Redhead here in writing a explicitly in the form of a condition 
in the probabilities), since for any partition £hi], 
P(e/a) = I:P(e/h;&a)P(h;/a) = I:P(h;/a) = 1, 
where the filter condition ensures that the only h; contributing to the sum is such 
that P( e/h;&a) = 1. It more or less immediately follows that P( e/ - h&a) = 1. 
Hence it does seem, when h is constructed in order to explain e, that the condition 
that e be improbable relative to a and the denial of h is never satisfied. 
But it only seems that way. First of all, Redhead's filter condition is, as it 
stands, an impossibly strong condition, for it assigns a tautology zero prior proba-
bility (a tautology does not imply e). Even if tautologies are excluded by fiat, then 
ifh implies e one can always find a nontautologous consequence ofh that doesn't, 
and that must apparently then be assigned a zero probability where h is assigned 
a positive one, contradicting the probability calculus also. Presumably, the filter 
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condition is intended only to apply to the hypotheses in some partition. Whichever 
partition is chosen, however, it is easy to see that the filter condition still has the 
consequence that P(e/a) = 1. But this implies that P(h' /e&a) = P(h' /a), where 
h' is any hypothesis that entails e modulo a, whether h' was constructed to do 
so or not, so that h' cannot be confirmed by e either. In other words, Redhead's 
filter condition, even relativized to an 'appropriate' partition, is still too strong, 
for it cannot make the discrimination between the two types of hypothesis he 
wishes to make. 
To sum up: nobody has made out a tenable case for supposing that when h is 
constructed to explain e, e cannot therefore be regarded as improbable on the sup-
position that his false. On the contrary, there seems no reason at all why this con-
dition should not be satisfied. Take the Mendel case, for example. Mendel ob-
served a fairly exact and stable ratio of tall to dwarf peas, whose occurrence in 
just those conditions corresponding to his careful selection of and mating the par-
ent and first generation plants, for which only his theory of inherited, indepen-
dently, and equiprobably segregated factors seemed to offer an explanation. In 
other words, the probability of obtaining such data, were Mendel's account not 
the correct one, should certainly not be unity. Of course, Mendel's theory was 
not widely regarded at that time as receiving great support from the data. But the 
explanation is not in P(e/ - h) being unity, but in the contemporary implausibility 
of the particulate model that contradicted the favored blending theory. 
In fact, the null-support thesis explains nothing, for it is false. Counterexam-
ples abound, and we do not even have to go to the history of science to find them: 
they can be invented ad lib. The following two, one statistical and the other deter-
ministic, should suffice. They are are extremely simple in structure (one almost 
laughably so); and this is an advantage from more than the purely expository point 
of view, for it means that their salient characteristic can be diagnosed im-
mediately. 
(a) An urn contains an unknown number of black and white tickets, where the 
proportion p of black tickets is also unknown. The data consists simply in a report 
of the relative frequency r/k of black tickets in a large number k of draws with 
replacement from the urn. In the light of the data we propose the hypothesis that 
p = (r/k)+s for some suitable s depending on k. This hypothesis is, according 
to standard statistical lore, very well supported by the data from which it is clearly 
constructed. It is worth briefly going into the reasons why we take it to be well 
supported. They are that we are employing as a background theory the hypothesis 
that the 'experiment' has the structure of a sequence of so-called Bernoulli trials, 
in which p is the binomial parameter, which is to say that the draws are assumed 
to be independent with constant probability p of getting a black ticket. r/k deter-
mines a confidence interval oflength 2s for p, where the confidence level together 
with k determines s. I am not particularly concerned here with the ultimate 
epistemic rightness or wrongness of regarding these intervals as actually justify-
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ing confidence of the relevant degree. My concern is simply with what is actually 
and uniformly regarded as legitimate practice, and there is no question but that 
confidence interval estimates of physical parameters, derived via some back-
ground theory involving assumptions about the form of the error distribution, are 
the empirical bedrock upon which practically all quantitative science is built. 
But we can point to a feature of the hypothesis we have derived about p, which 
is, I submit, highly germane to an explanation of its epistemic merit. This is that 
the probability of the sample data relative to the same background distribution, 
but on the assumption that the parameter p lies somewhere outside the specified 
interval, is very much smaller than its small probability on the assumption that 
p does in fact lie in that interval. Recall that this is just the condition, endorsed 
by the Bayesian theory, for a high posterior probability for that interval to contain 
p. Let us leave the discussion in abeyance and now look at (b). 
(b) The urn remains the same, but instead of sampling with replacement we 
now sample without replacement, and continue until the um is empty. The 
proportion p of black tickets we discover to be po, and this now becomes our 
hypothesis about the value ofp. Surely in this case the sample data support, since 
together with background information to the effect that the um has remained the 
same throughout, they entail the hypothesis that p =po (and a fortiori the proba-
bility of the sample data on the assumption that that hypothesis is false is zero, 
given the background information). 
While it is difficult to maintain that (b) is representative of much of quotidian 
scientific inference, both it and the more representative (a) are nevertheless very 
instructive. They are both cases where background theory supplies a model of the 
experiment that leaves only a parameter to be calculated from the data, and that 
background theory is sufficiently firmly entrenched to be taken more or less for 
granted (though additional data may conceivably lead to its being questioned, 
nonetheless). Continuity considerations would therefore seem to suggest that in 
general, the support of a hypothesis h(ao) obtained from a parametric hypothesis 
h, whose adjustable parameter(s) is (are) evaluated as ao from the data, should 
depend on the prior plausibility of the parametric model h. 
I shall argue that this is indeed the case, with the help of an example that might 
be thought a rather surprising choice. In this rather simple and idealized example, 
the data from which ao was evaluated are going to be data that are quite uninfor-
mative about the truth or falsity of the model h itself. So: let h be the hypothesis 
that two observable variables x and y are related linearly, so that y = ex +d, for 
some c,d that are to be determined by observation; and suppose also that we have 
no reason to believe that, within an interval determined by background informa-
tion, any one set of values is any more likely than any other. Let e consist of two 
independent joint observations of x and y. Thus e determines, up to some interval 
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depending on the error distribution over the observations, values of c and d, 
which we shall represent by ao. 
Computing the degree to which e supports h(ao) as the difference e makes to 
your assessment of the likelihood of h (not using that term in its specialized 
statistical sense), it is easy to see, even without assuming that these 'quantities' 
are represented by numbers as opposed to the members of some arbitrary additive 
semigroup, that this support may be considerable, though it is bounded above by 
the prior credibility of the model h. For the credibility of h(a0) in the light of e 
is, given the assumption of the mutual independence of h and e, no more and no 
less than the prior credibility ofh, since all e then does is evaluate the parameters 
c and d. But the credibility of h(ao) independently of e is negligible, since (c,d) 
can, we may assume, take any values in the plane (usually there will be some prior 
restriction on their possible values, but these may well be very broad indeed). It 
follows that were we to possess exactly the same information as we do now, with 
the exception of a knowledge of e itself, then the adjunction of e would usually 
make some, and possibly a considerable, difference to our evaluation of the credi-
bility of h(a0). In other words, the potential of e to alter the credibility of h(ao) 
in an otherwise identical knowledge situation will vary with the prior plausibility 
ofh. 
But surely this proves too much-for how could e possibly support h(ao) when 
e by hypothesis provides no information relevant to the truth of h? The answer 
simply is that e does support h(ao) to the extent that it raises its probability in 
general. I suspect that the apparent force of the objection derives from covertly 
assuming the truth of the so-called Consequence Condition, that if evidence sup-
ports a hypothesis then it must support every logical consequence of that hypothe-
sis. I have in effect just presented an argument that I believe shows the Conse-
quence Condition to be false. Indeed, as Popper and Miller have shown (1983), 
if we make increase in probability the criterion for support, then every hypothesis 
supported by some data has a logical consequence that is actually countersup-
ported, in the sense that its probability is decreased, by that data. The Conse-
quence Condition is in conflict also with more basic intuitions. We do believe, 
I think, that the approximate constancy of the acceleration induced in falling 
apples supported Newton's gravitational theory, but also that it did not support 
the bare hypothesis that the gravitational force is not everywhere constant. 
It is, I believe, just because support for h(ao) tends to be conflated with support 
for h that the null-support thesis is so firmly entrenched: what seems to happen 
is that the null support for h in cases like the above gets illicitly transferred to 
h(ao). The conflation is apparent, for example, in John Worrall's grounding his 
conclusion that "of the empirically accepted logical consequences of a theory 
those, and only those, used in the construction of the theory fail to count in its 
support," on the alleged fact that "Mercury's perihelion [advance] is not regarded 
as supporting classical theory," although it is predicted by versions of that theory 
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(1978, 48). Classical theory may or may not be supported; but even were it not 
supported, it certainly would not follow, as Worrall's inference presupposes, that 
the versions of classical theory that predict the perihelion advance are not sup-
ported by it. 
Now let us observe that the informal, intuitive reasoning above is perfectly 
mirrored in the Bayesian theory. The asumption of the mutual irrelevance of h 
and e translates into the condition of probabilistic independence: P(h&e) = 
P(h)P(e). Note also that, modulo initial conditions, h(a0) ( =) h&e; and substitut-
ing appropriately into Bayes's theorem we obtain P(h(a0)/e)-P(h(ao) = 
P(h)[l-P(e)] (Howson 1984, 248-49). Thus P(h) is an upper bound on the sup-
port, which is positive so long as P(e)< 1 (we assume that P(h)>O). 
The dependence of the support ofh(ao) bye on the prior probability ofh (since 
the support depends on the prior probability of h(ao), which implies h) is quite 
general in the Bayesian theory, and is reflected in the judgments of working scien-
tists. The statistician and biometrician Karl Pearson discovered a family of den-
sity curves (his Type I, II, III, IV, and V curves), which he was prone to fit to 
a great variety of data, in a way that to many of his contemporaries seemed 
frankly ad hoc: on one such occasion the economist Edgeworth pointedly asked 
"what weight should be attached to this correspondence by one who does not per-
ceive any theoretical reason for those formulas?" (Edgeworth 1895). Kepler fitted 
ellipses to Tycho's data on planetary orbits, but he also thought it necessary to 
present independent reasons for that type of orbit. Nearer to home we find Kitcher 
(1985) castigating a piece of sociobiologists' parameter adjustment on the ground 
that "the model gives absolutely no insight into the reasons behind the periodicity 
[the adjusted parameter] . . . the choice of a periodic function for the probabil-
ity bears no relation to any psychological mechanisms" (375). And so on; anyone 
can find a host of examples. 
The application to the initial problem of discriminating the support of the ad 
hoc variants (1) from that of y = f(x) is now clear. The introduction of the 
parameters a1, ... ,a,,, which are subsequently evaluated from the data, cor-
responds to postulating models 
y = f(x) + (x-a1) ... (x-an)g(x) 
of the experimental situation that we simply have no reason to believe true-and 
because the set of these 'models' is infinite, and for none of them is there the 
remotest reason to believe it true; the credibility of each is literally zero. Thus 
the situation with the hypotheses (1) falls under the general case of evaluating the 
support of h(ao), where the prior credibility of the model his zero, or effectively 
so. This conclusion may seem a little disappointing: the hypotheses (1) are not 
supported by the data, because in effect we don't think the sort of structure they 
postulate is the true one. Isn't an assessment of support supposed to justify rather 
than be justified by our convictions as to what is likely to be true and what isn't? 
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We have seen many attempts to construct theories of confirmation that claim 
a priori status. But nothing comes out of nothing; and all these theories incor-
porate just such convictions, often, as in Carnap's systems, in a disguised form, 
as basic principles. Jeffreys's theory (expeunded in his [1948]) delivers the judg-
ment that the parametric hypotheses of which (1) are instances are a priori less 
likely to be true than y = f(x). This judgment is an immediate consequence of 
his Simplicity Postulate, which asserts as a general principle that of the hypothe-
ses advanced within science, those with fewer undetermined parameters (simpler 
in Jeffreys's sense) are a priori more likely to be true than those with more. How-
ever, Jeffreys himself did not see the Simplicity Postulate as an a priori valid prin-
ciple; for him it was rather an explicit recognition of scientific practice: the sim-
plest equations are as a matter of fact preferred when fitting curves to data (1948, 
10). 
In the unlikely event of absolutely no background information about the ex-
perimental source, simplicity by itself may well play a role in determining levels 
of support among the uncountably many possible functional relationships consis-
tent with the data. Clearly, if a proposed curve fits some initial set ei of observa-
tions, and continues to fit all subsequent sets, we should want to say that in so 
doing it becomes increasingly well supported; but this is possible only if its proba-
bility prior to all the observations were positive. Since the curve is likely to have 
been relatively simple among all the possibilities, we are in such circumstances 
implicitly taking simplicity to be a ground for assigning a moderate or at any rate 
nonzero prior probability. But in general, where there is a body of background 
information constraining the plausible candidates, simplicity and prior probabil-
ity may well not march in step. So the Simplicity Postulate must be rejected as 
a principle of general scope. (Its rejection has often been urged on the grounds 
of alleged inconsistency, most recently by Watkins [1985, 110-16]; that charge, 
I have argued elsewhere [1988], is incorrect.) 
Popper's well-known reversal of Jeffreys's probability ordering must also be 
rejected. Popper's reason for adopting the converse ordering is that being more 
easily tested, simpler hypotheses are less probable than more complex ones. But 
this is to confuse pragmatics with epistemology: we simply have no ground a pri-
ori for believing that more easily testable hypotheses are less - or for that matter 
more- likely to be true, and we should certainly not allow strong and, in prin-
ciple, ungroundable epistemological assumptions, which these in fact are, to play 
the role of logical axioms. 
Questions of ultimate justification are, however, beside the point of this exer-
cise, which is the much more limited one of diagnosing the differential status we 
accord the hypotheses (1) compared with the initial y=f(x); and we have shown 
that the fact that the former were generated using the data and the former is not 
in itself the cause. The crucial feature of the variants (1), which accounts for their 
comparatively low status, is that the introduction of the parameters ai, ... ,!ln 
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has no justification in terms of what we think likely to be true (the same point is 
made in Nickles [1985, 200; and 1987]). 
4. Prediction and Accommodation; the Bayesian Analysis 
I have argued that, depending on circumstances, hypotheses can be and often 
are regarded as supported by data employed as constraints in their construction. 
The circumstances can be summarized in the condition that P(e/ - h)/P(e/h) be 
small. This condition is, of course, as I pointed out earlier, just the Bayesian con-
dition for a high posterior probability of h. 
The null-support thesis is false. The motivation for it was a desire to disqualify 
certain types of patently ad hoc accommodation by a: theory of otherwise adverse, 
or at best neutral, data. A doctrine weaker than the null-support thesis, but simi-
larly motivated, concedes that while accommodated data may give some support, 
it is nevertheless never to the same extent as if the data in question had been in-
dependently predicted. This is also false, and again it is not difficult to manufac-
ture informal counterexamples to it. Consider the following (in essence due to 
Peter Urbach). A numerologist employs a number of algorithms, in a manner 
claimed to represent the vagaries of divine will, to predict dates of major earth-
quakes in California, where 'major' means exceeding some given Richter value. 
This goes on year after year, failures of the phenomenon to occur to order being 
explained away suitably, until eventually one such prediction comes true. Estab-
lished geophysical theory predicts (let us suppose; the moral does not depend on 
factual accuracy) that earthquakes of such magnitude occur when and only when 
the strain along a fault line exceeds by some specified quantity a critical value. 
There is no independent way of estimating when this value will be exceeded. I 
think that there are few people who would credit the numerologist's theory with 
greater support from the observed phenomenon than the assertion that on the date 
at which that phenomenon was observed the strain exceeded the critical value by 
at least the amount specified by standard theory. And the reason why we do not 
regard the independently predicting hypothesis as having no support here is the 
same as the reason why we regard the data-constructed hypotheses (1) as having 
no support in the circumstances in which they arose: we simply don't believe that 
they can be true. Being constructed or not from the data has nothing to do with it. 
Although the general thesis that an independently predicting hypothesis is al-
ways better supported by the data so predicted than is one that is deliberately con-
structed to explain them is false, there is an important residuum that is not. Be-
cause it lends itself to a perspicuous treatment, let us again consider the example 
of three hypotheses h', h, and h(ao). has before contains an undetermined param-
eter that is evaluated from e. h is inconsistent with h', which independently 
predicts e; h(ao) only 'predicts' e after the event (ao is the parameter in h evaluated 
from e). Finally, we shall suppose that the prior probabilities of h and h' are 
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equal. In more idiomatic language, h and h' are rival explanatory frameworks; 
h' predicts the effect e, and so does h(ao), but only as a consequence of e's having 
antecedently been used to calculate a free parameter in h: h' predicted, while 
h(ao) is merely an accommodation of, the data. In these circumstances it seems 
correct to say that h' picks up more support from e than does h(ao). 
This is -or at any rate seems to be- the residuum of truth in the false general 
thesis that independent prediction invariably scores higher in terms of support 
than accommodation. It is certainly regarded as true from the point of view of 
the Bayesian theory; indeed, it is very easily generated as a consequence of that 
theory, where support S is measured as simply the difference of posterior and 
prior probabilities. For where the initial conditions are regarded as being part of 
background knowledge, we have S(h' /e) = P(h' )[1-P(e)]/P(e), and S(h(ao),e) 
= P(h(ao))[l-P(e)]/P(e). But by assumption P(h') = P(h) ~ P(h(ao)) and so 
S(h' ,e) ~ S(h(ao),e). Admittedly, the inequality is weak, and so to say that h' 
picks up strictly more support from e is strictly incorrect. Never mind; the result 
is good enough. 
The sufficient condition for the inequality must not be forgotten; it is that h 
has at most the prior probability of h' . If for example the parameter in h is in-
troduced purely ad hoc to yield the desired effect, this ad hocness will be regis-
tered in the prior probability of h being small if not negligible (such would have 
presumably been the case with the de Sitter modification of Poincare's Lorentz-
invariant gravitational theory, which contained a parameter specifically 
introduced to explain the annual shift in Mercury's perihelion). It must be empha-
sized that this is merely a special case, though I suspect that the apparent plausibil-
ity of the thesis that independent prediction always gleans more support than ac-
commodation rests on nothing more than invalidly generalizing from it. 
5. The Objections to Personalistic Bayesianism 
The Bayesian theory seems to offer a most promising formal reconstruction 
of our intuitive reasoning in the contexts we have discussed. It is, furthermore, 
to my knowledge the only methodological theory that is capable of making sense 
of our intuitions, to say nothing of canonical practice, in those, and other, con-
texts. But objections, and on the face of it powerful ones, have been brought 
against its credentials to perform such a reconstructive role. 
One such objection is highly relevant to the problem we started with, of assess-
ing the supportive power of known facts relative to theories whose construction 
is carried out with those facts employed as explicit constraints. The objection, 
which I alluded to eadier, in section 2, is that if e is already known then both P( e) 
and P(e/h) ought to b~ set equal to one, and not only then do all the Bayesian for-
mulas we have written down adopt trivial forms, but in particular the support (2) 
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simply goes to zero, so that the support of hypotheses by known data, whether 
they were designed to satisfy the data or not, is uniformly zero. 
The objection originates with Glymour (1980, Chap. 3). It is, I believe, based 
on a misunderstanding of how the Bayesian formulas are intended to be inter-
preted, and it has a straightforward and natural answer (and one, we shall see, 
that Glymour himself anticipates). This answer is as follows. The Bayesian 
claims that the support that e gives a hypothesis h is to be evaluated by the extent 
to which the observation of e alters the prior credibility you attach to h. What does 
this mean when e is already known? It cannot mean that that the P(e) and P(e/h) 
terms are trivially one, since e is always known at the time you compute the sup-
port function: you would be guilty of a simple misapplication of the theory, rather 
analogous to dividing both sides of an equation by zero, if you therefore made 
those probabilities unity. What P(e) is intended to convey, whether e is known 
or not, is how likely you think e would be were (i) h true and (ii) h false; and P( e) 
is simply a weighted sum of these two magnitudes. 
To the extent, then, that support is a function of P(e), it is a function not of 
an actual probability, but of a subjunctively characterized one; and when e is 
known, the subjunctive conditional characterizing it becomes counterfactual: 
how probable do you think e would be if you didn't already know it to be the case 
relative to the suppositions, respectively, that (i) h is true, and (ii) h is false? 
There is absolutely nothing ad hoc or in conflict with core Bayesian principles 
in defining support in this way. On the contrary, it seems a very natural way of 
proceeding. Certainly the presence of subjunctives in the definition of the constit-
uent probabilities is nothing new: the definition of conditional probabilities is also 
cast in the subjunctive mood, as we observed earlier. 
Glymour himself considers this response to his objection quite sympatheti-
cally, but he is doubtful as to whether adequate consistent procedures exist for 
computing these probabilities. He considers various methods for calculating such 
values and concludes that they do not work. I am quite willing to concede that 
it is difficult if not impossible to come up with a sharp value for the probability 
I would attribute to a stone's falling to the ground when dropped if current gravita-
tion theory were false, but this is just one of those occasions when the deliver-
ances of the Bayesian rule are going to be very imprecise. Moreover, the exis-
tence or otherwise of algorithms or general criteria of evaluation is beside the 
point for the sort of Bayesianism I am considering here, which is not a source 
of rules for computing all the probabilities figuring in Bayes's theorem, but simply 
an attempted reconstruction of a type of intuitive reasoning, in which more or less 
rough estimates of various probabilities are made. Some of these can be analyzed 
as involving the application of a particular rule, and others cannot, and have to 
be treated simply as exogenously determined data, among which typically are the 
prior probabilities P(e) and P(h). 
The relegation of P(e) and P(h) to the status of exogenous parameters whose 
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values in many cases seem not to be susceptible of any even moderately precise 
determination might well seem to invite the charge of triviality. Take the mere 
presence of the undetermined parameters P(e) and P(h) first. These have fre-
quently been identified as a source of weakness in the Personalistic Bayesian the-
ory, allegedly undermining any claim it might make either to explanatory status 
(those parameters can be adjusted to ensure consistency with practically any 
historical judgment of what has supported what: due to their presence the theory 
is allegedly no more than "a soft and rubberlike system which is easy to manipu-
late") or to objectivity (they can be adjusted in a way that, e.g., "allows [people] 
to assign zero probability to a promising rival hypothesis that threatens ones they 
personally favour"). (Both quotations are from Watkins [1985, 308].) 
Let us address these objections in turn. First, the presence of undetermined 
parameters does not preclude a hypothesis's either being tested or having the ca-
pacity to explain phenomena. Every scientific theory of note has some parameters 
undetermined within the theory. It has to be conceded that it is often not possible 
to arrive at anything like precise measurements of individuals' prior probabilities; 
but this does not distinguish that account from other quite respectable explanatory 
theories, where sometimes the estimated values of parameters amount to nothing 
more than a well-grounded qualitative assumption. How many times, for ex-
ample, do we see explanations in the physical sciences and elsewhere prefixed 
with remarks like "the masses may be considered to be so small that the potential 
energy of interaction is zero," or "suppose a < < b; then ... "; and so forth. 
Qualitative assessments ofbelieffor which there is independent evidence can sup-
port just as good explanations in the Bayesian account. 
But what about the charge of extreme subjectivism? It is, after all, the ines-
capable subjectivity of Bayesian assessments of support, depending as they do on 
the individual's priors, that alarms people most, and that inspired Fisher's famous 
and influential verdict that those assessments are measures "of merely psychologi-
cal tendencies, theorem concerning which are useless for scientific purposes" 
(Fisher 1947, 6-7), echoed more recently in Jaynes's verdict that "personalistic 
probability belongs to the field of psychology and has no place in applied statis-
tics" (Jaynes 1968, 231). These dismal conclusions are quite unwarranted, how-
ever. Partly they result from a simple non sequitur. The subject matter of the Per-
sonalist Bayesian theory is beliefs, and beliefs are, of course, psychological. But 
the theory is not psychology: it sets out to describe not beliefs as such, but the 
structure of beliefs regulated by consistency constraints that are completely ob-
jective. The Personalist Bayesian theory is, in other words, a logic of beliefs; it 
consists in setting out conditions of consistency that are no less objective than 
those of deductive logic. To be fair, even the defenders of the Personalistic theory 
do not emphasise-or even appear to recognize-its unimpeachably logical sta-
tus. They almost invariably concede the charge of outright subjectivism, and try 
to mitigate it by appeal to the very general phenomenon of asymptotic conver-
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gence of the posterior probabilities relative to the same data. The charge should 
not, I stress, be conceded in the first place. 
But it must be conceded that judgments of support do, according to the Per-
sonalistic theory, reflect to a greater or lesser extent the influence of one's own 
prior belief distribution. Before one condemns this as amounting to a betrayal of 
objective standards, one should ponder the status of principles that affect to deter-
mine substantive inductive judgments. These principles, however 'objective' they 
purport to be, are inevitably assumptions, and moreover somebody's assump-
tions, and honesty compels that they should be presented as such. The Personalis-
tic theory merely calls a spade a spade. If anybody still doubts that it is necessary 
to give explicit recognition to the role of undefended prior belief in inductive in-
ference, they should examine with care (as Peter Urbach and I do [1988]) those 
theories, like classical statistics, for example, that claim to dispense with it. I sus-
pect that they will eventually, though possibly reluctantly, recognize that those 
theories do not deliver the goods. They should also recall that they do not dismiss 
deductive logic because it refrains from supplying criteria for justifying premises 
as well as inferences. Deductive logic contents itself with judgments of the form: 
"If you wish to remain consistent, then if you believe this set of statements to be 
true, you must also accept that statement as true." The same acceptance of the 
limitations of the power of human reason implicit in the restriction of scope here 
is unfortunately still not evident in 'objective' discussions of inductive inference. 
Let us now return to the ability of the Bayesian theory to explain characteristic 
modes of inductive inference. It is raised in an apparently acute form by some 
empirical studies of subjects' evaluations of statistical data, and in a well-known 
survey Kahneman and Tversky express a strongly negative conclusion: 
The usefulness of the normative Bayesian approach to the analysis and the 
modeling of subjective probability depends primarily not on the accuracy of 
the subjective estimates, but rather on whether the model captures the essential 
determinants of the judgment process . . . In his evaluation of evidence 
[however] man is apparently ... not Bayesian at all. (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1982, 46) 
I cannot go into the detailed evidence that is taken to support this conclusion; 
it would take far too long. I shall simply concede that there are areas in which 
popular modes of reasoning fail to satisfy the Bayesian constraints (so much, in-
cidentally, for the claim that the theory imposes none). So what? Statistical infer-
ence is an area in which popular reasoning is notoriously subject to simple falla-
cies. Wason's celebrated card paradox (Wason 1966) exhibits an area where 
popular deductive intuitions also fail in just such uniform ways. Kahneman and 
Tversky might wish to conclude from this that people are not deductive logicians 
either; and to an extent they would be right. But that is not a conclusion that 
should disturb those who claim that the canons of deductive logic exercise visible 
FITTING YOUR THEORY TO THE FACTS 24] 
constraints on the way people reason, especially after some reflection, in a great 
variety of circumstances. We know that they recognize, at least in principle, that 
the characteristic of deductive inferences that makes them valuable is that they 
preserve truth, and it would be strange indeed if they were unable to exercise this 
knowledge in cases that make not too great demands on their powers of reasoning. 
The same ought to be true of probabilistic reasoning, and the criteria of con-
sistency that apply there. The mathematical theory of probability, as a matter of 
historical fact, started life as the theory of fair odds, and as such was immediately 
applied to the problem of inductive inference by the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century mathematicians. The fact that the criteria developed by the theory are not 
uniformly applied by everybody does not mean that people in general are not 
capable of recognizing the authority of those criteria, nor that in many simple 
cases they are incapable of applying them. 
I am going to consider one final objection to this exercise in explanatory Bayes-
ianism (a more complete discussion of all these, together with other objections, 
is to be found in Howson and Urbach (1988]). This is not to say that there are 
not others, but the list is a long one, and a criterion of importance has to be exer-
cised if this paper is not to get too tail heavy. I shall not, therefore, discuss the 
status of Jeffreys-conditionalization, or other proposed modifications of the 'dy-
namic assumption', since they do not really conflict with any principle I have in-
voked here, nor shall I discuss David Miller's (1966) charge, now known as 
Miller's paradox, that the way the Bayesian evaluates likelihoods in terms of the 
values of a given physical probability distribution is inconsistent. (Graham Oddie 
and I have, I think, shown in Howson and Oddie [1979] that Miller's reasoning 
rests on a standard type of fallacy.) 
This final objection is one with which readers of the earlier discussion will now 
be familiar. It is that to whatever extent we may invoke estimates of credibility 
in our inductive reasoning, we do so qualitatively, and it is beyond question that 
we could never honestly refine these to points in the real continuum. Yet the 
Bayesian theory is a theory of point-valued subjective probabilities. It has been 
proposed (e.g., by Koopman [1940], Good [1962], Smith [1961], Dempster 
[1968], and Williams [1976]), in response to such observations, that a theory of 
interval-valued probabilities would furnish a more realistic foundation for a the-
ory of subjective uncertainty, and these authors have indeed developed such a the-
ory, which now tends to go under the name of the theory of upper and lower prob-
abilities (the upper and lower probabilities are the end points of the intervals). 
The theory is a generalization of the point-valued theory; the latter is obtained 
when upper and lower probabilities are identical. It is not clear, however, that 
more realism is imported into such a theory, since the upper and lower probabili-
ties themselves are point valued, and it seems no easier in principle to arrive at 
nonarbitrary values for these than for point probabilities themselves. 
Should we attempt to find more realistic weakenings of the point-probability 
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model? Personally, I do not think so. Certainly the objection that we cannot 
realistically claim to make point-valued probability assessments should not force 
us to abandon the point model. For that objection is not at all as strong as it 
sounds; it is, on the contrary, very frail. In the first place, there is nothing in the 
Personalist theory that says that anyone does make point estimates: that theory 
is quite compatible with people's actual evaluations being as crude and as qualita-
tive as you like. Moreover, the people who take this objection seriously commit 
themselves thereby to a position on the use of real number theory in empirical 
science that they ought, on reflection, to find wholly untenable. For ifthe fact that 
point values are in principle incapable of being arrived at is taken to invalidate 
such explanatory claims, then we sfiould have to give up obedience to the laws 
of real arithmetic as the explanation of why we employ our customary modes of 
calculation where any physical magnitude is concerned. Although we are quite 
happy with the usual mathematical theory of length, volume, etc., that makes 
these quantities real-valued, it is nevertheless a fact that the length of, e.g., a 
room, is not, even discounting the practical impossibility of arbitrarily precise 
measurement, a real number, nor even an exact nondegenerate interval of real 
numbers. Our estimates of such magnitudes are made only to within a non-
degenerate interval possessing no exact upper and lower limits, which in principle 
cannot be refined to a single point. This does not invalidate a theory of these mag-
nitudes that postulates real-number values, or render meaningless calculations 
based on real arithmetic; we should not, therefore, feel obliged either to regard 
the theory of point-valued probabilities as invalidated by similar facts about the 
nature of subjective probability. 
6. Conclusion 
Methodological theories wax and wane, like the scientific hypotheses that are 
their subject matter. The mathematical treatment of uncertainty based on the 
probability calculus was one such; announced in the pages of the Port Royal Logic 
and some writings of Leibniz, it rapidly developed in scope and sophistication, 
and reached its apogee in the early years of the nineteenth century. It enabled you 
to compute the odds in games of chance, the odds on the sun rising the next day, 
and the odds on coincident testimonies of witnesses being the result of their telling 
the truth. By the early twentieth century the theory was virtually dead, the victim 
of untoward facts-not empirical facts, to be sure, but logical ones. It was incon-
sistent, and the inconsistency was, so it appeared, at the very heart of the theory. 
Yet half a century later it is back again, risen like Lazarus, and fast recruiting 
disillusioned members of more recent faiths. 
Amended to give the theory now known as Personalist Bayesianism, it is 
demonstrably consistent. The cost of consistency was abandoning the famous 
method, called by Keynes the "Principle of Indifference" and by von Kries the 
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"Principle of Insufficient Reason," for obtaining ostensibly 'informationless' prior 
probabilities. The Principle of Indifference prescribes uniform probability or 
probability-density distributions over bounded parameter-spaces as the mathe-
matical representation of ignorance, but it became apparent that these distribu-
tions are far from invariant under different ways of representing the hypothesis 
space, with the result that the same hypothesis may be assigned different values 
depending on the space in which it is embedded. Worse, one and the same 
hypothesis may be assigned different values under logically (or, to be more pre-
cise, logico-mathematically) equivalent representations of the hypothesis space. 
People have tried to bring back suitably watered-down versions of the prin-
ciple (they are known as Objective Bayesians). I have argued in the foregoing sec-
tions, however, that no loss in desirable strength results from simply declining 
to prescribe any criteria for determining prior probabilities. The addition of such 
criteria merely burdens the theory with indefensible assumptions, even where 
they are consistent. Without them, I have argued, we possess a logic of confirma-
tion that admits that our theories are no more than theories, and seeks to discover 
what can be constructed according to the sole criterion of consistency. And that, 
I have tried to show, is quite a lot. Had Popper not shown such animosity toward 
the enterprise of bringing subjective probabilities into epistemology, and had he 
not laid down a priori his own stultifying criterion - a criterion that I have argued 
at length (Howson 1973, 1987) is just as indefensible as the Principle of Indiffer-
ence that it much resembles-for prior probabilities, that in all interesting cases 
they should be zero, he might therefore have recognized in Personalist Bayesian-
ism a genuine, purely deductive logic of confirmation, yielding nontrivial infor-
mation, yet free of the sort of synthetic inductive principles he rightly declared 
should have no place in methodology. 
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